A common view of reasoning in cognitive science is that it is a process that operates on abstract sentential representations. This view implies a separation of reasoning from sensory perception. Consequently, the study of perception has proceeded relatively independently of the study of various reasoning strategies that humans employ. In this paper we argue that there are many commonsense situations in which human reasoning is tightly coupled with perception, in particular with perceptually represented experiential knowledge. This type of reasoning is referred to as perceptual reasoning. This idea is based on a proposal about representations and supporting mechanisms that underlie visual perception and imagery. Perceptual reasoning is explained in terms of experientially acquired perceptual inference rules. Fmally, the implications of this stance are discussed.
Introduction
Sensation, perception, coglfition, and reasoning have all been subjects of study by cognitive psychologists. How are these related7 One answer, from an information processing perspective, is that reasoning operates on information about the world around us. This infomtation is made available to the cognitive system through the processes of sensation, perception, and cognition. Are these four processes strictly sequential, influencing each other in a unidirectional way7 While it ,seems obvious that sensation must precede perception, it is not evident that cognition must strictly follow perception or that reasoning must operate solely on post-cognitive representations. The work of Biederman (1987) human object recognition, for example, suggests that perception of a few shapes in an object can trigger recognition which then can influence perception. Deliberate reasoning has been typically characterized as operating on post-cognitive representations and therefore divorced from acts of perception and cognition that produced them. However, the view that human reasoning and behavior is tightly coupled with (situated in) perception is gaining increasing credence. excellent illustration of perceptually grounded reasoning is given in Shrager's account of commonsense perception (Shrager, 1990) . Another confuunding phenomenon in the visual modality has been that of mental imagery. Any theory of visual perception and cognition that postulates some underlying representations and mechanisms has to account for this phenomenon.
In the context of these ideas, namely that perception and cognition influence each other, that any theory of perceptual representations and mechanisms should account for imagery also, and that reasoning is sometimes tightly coupled with perception, the contents of this paper can he summarized as follows. First we attempt to characterize representations that perception delivers and a perceptual architecture that supports them. It is suggested that the specialized (to the visual modality) nature of this architecture and modality-specific operations on perceptual representations that it provides together can account for mental imagery. Then an account of commonsense reasoning about perceptual events in terms of experientially acquired perceptual inference rules is given. What is outlined here are the beginnings of a theory of commonsense visual reasoning based on the twin ideas of modality-specific representations and inference rules with perceptual and conceptual content (Chandrasekaran & Narayanan, 1990b) . Following the description of perceptual reasotfing, the implications of our stance are discussed.
(1) Perceptual representations must clearly be compositional, since we can compose different (even previously unseen) mental images quite easily and rapidly. Biederman's (1987) theory of recognition by courponents (RBC) suggests that such representations must be componential, and hence compositional.
(2) Perceptual representations must contain information about the represented object at different levels of detail since we are able to imagine a previously seen object at different resolutions. This suggests that the representations may be hierarchically structured with levels of increasing detail, along the lines suggested by Marr and Nishihara (1978) .
(3) Perceptual representalinns must support an "internal depiction" of the represented object since a mental image is an experience of such a depiction. Indeed, researchers have postulated mechanisms such as the visual buffer (Kosslyn, 1981) and symbol-filled arrays (Tye, 1991) to account for this depictive property.
(4) Perceptual representations must also have a descriptive component encoding structural information, as Hinton (1979) points out.
After a review of imagery literature, Slezak (1991) suggests that there is a need for further theorizing about mechanisms and representations that support perception and inmgery. Our proposal, outlined here and elaborated elsewhere (Chandrasekaran & Narayanan, 1990a; 1990b) , is to be taken in this spirit. The core idea is that hierarchically structured descriptive representations when loaded from long term memory into a specialized (to the visual modality) architecture that provides medality-specilic operations on these representations can give rise to the experience of mental imagery.
The analogic-propositional debate in imagery literature centered around two kinds of representations. One is the analog representation motivated by mental imagery. However, while few deny the experience of mental imagery, the hypothesis that analog representations underlie mental imagery has been questioned. Those who subscribe to this hypothesis are impressed by what they see as evidence for subjects' preferential use of pictorial operations on mental images. To account for this they ascribe to this representation certain properties that are usually associated with pictures. Thus pictorial operations like scanning have a special status in analog representational theories, but not in propositional theories. The other group subscribes to the notion of propositional representations. Propositions have identifiable predicate and argument constituents, bear troth values, and have rules of formation. In the propositional view of perceptual representations, propositions that encode perceived information about objects and events are created. Propositional theories have an underlying implication that the rules which govern how propositions are interpreted are independent of the perceptual modality that produced the propositions. In other words, a general purpose mechanism that is modality-independent is assumed to operate on propositional representations.
Thus the intrinsic property of propositional representations is their uniformity of representation and processing across modalities.
However, a third possibility that has not been considered so far is that perceptual representations are similar to the discrete symbolic representations used by computers. A discrete symbolic representation consists of structures of symbols composed according to well-defmed rules of formation. A symbol is just a token, and by itself devoid of any meaning. Therefore Ihe distinctive property of such a representation is that its semantics derives from the nature of operations on it provided by the architecture of the system in which it resides. Therefore the same representation may he interpreted differently by different architectures. We suggest that perceptual representations are similar to discrete symbolic representations in that they also have this property. In other words, the experience of mental imagery and of applying operations like scanning on mental images arise not from any analogic property of the representations themselves, but from an interpretation of perceptual representations by a modality-specific architecture.
This characterization of perceptual representations is different from an analogic or propositional characterization. On one hand, unlike analog representations, these are not depictive, but are descriptive. On the other hand, unlike propositional representations, their interpretation is not based on some universal truth semantics, but is dependent on the architecture in which they reside. Since in this view the meaning of a perceptual representation derives from its interpretation by the underlying architecture and processes that operate upon it, properties exhibited by such a representation are not intrinsic to the representation itself, but stem from the modality-specific architecture that supports it and processes that operate on it. This feature provides a way to explain how non-analog representations can, in principle, give rise to the experience of intagery by virtue of being interpreted by an underlying modality-specilic architecture.
Perceptual representations are lfierarchical structures composed of descriptors. The descriptors are of visual attributes such as shape, color, texture, etc. as well as of spatial relations among elements. These are appropriately paranletrized. The parameters have relative meaning within some internal reference frame, allowing attribute value comparisons with other descriptors of the same type. The hierarchical structure reflects different levels of detail at which a perceived scene is encoded. The depth of the hierarchy and resolution of description at different levels depend upon aspects (such as objects inn the scene that were attended to, how closely they were looked at, etc.) of the act of perception which produced the perceptual representation.
A collection of descriptors in a perceptual representation that together correspond to a distinct element of a scene (such as an object or part of an object) forms a percept. A perceptual representation is made up of multiple percepts. percept is a basic unit or building block of perceptual representations. It describes all visually perceived information about a distinct element of an image. For instance, the percept of an apple would consist of descriptors of its shape, color and texture. Each percept has a corresponding mental image that resuRs from its interpretation. This image in the mind's eye is the depictive counterpart of the percept, which is descriptive in nature. The description and the depiction are two sides of the same coin. Thus a perceptual representation consisting of percepts is both an internal description of a perceived scene and a recipe for the composition of a corresponding mental image through interpretation. Percepts provide compositionality, i.e., allow one to compose perceptual representations (and corresponding mental images) from percepts that are parts of representations of different images.
The mental image of a scene results from accessing its perceptual representation in memory and bringing it into the. perceptual architecture. This visual-modality specific architecture provides imaginal operations on the representation. Ju~ as interpretation generates an experience of mental imagery, the invocation of an imaginal operation (e.g., scanning) c~mcomitanlly creales the correspomling experience (e.g., that of scanning an image with the mind's eye). The imaginal operatiom that tim perceptual architecture provides on perceptual representations are similar to the operations that the visual system employs under perceptual conditions, but they may not be identical (Reisherg, 1987) .
Note that though the analogy of discrete symbolic representations interpreted by an underlying computational architecture was used to explain perceptual representations, these need not necessarily he symbolic in nature. They may take the form of patterns of weights or strengths in a neural substrate. What is important are their properties: they are descritSive, compositional and hierarchically structured. This proposal does not require the postulation of an analog medium for images; neither does it contradict such a conjecture. It may very well he that interpretation of the perceptual representation of a scene results in the creation of a surface display in a visual buffer as Kosslyn (1981) suggests or the creation of a symbol-filled array as Tye (1991) suggests. On the other hand it may he the case that this interpretation merely produces the same pattern of activation within the visual cortex as that created by a topographic projection of the retinal image into One visu.,d cortex (which occurs while viewing the scene), thus creating the experience of mental imagery. Further neurophysiological research is certainly required to resolve this question. The main point here is that representations that are neither analog nor propositional and an underlying architecture that provides operations specific to the visual modality can possibly explain the phenomenon of imagery.
Perceptual Reasoning
Consider the following situation. You are seated with others around a table and you notice that someone sitting beside you is about to throw a rock. You then notice that the rock, if thrown, will hit a glass-paned window outside whirr a child is playing. Your immediate reaction will he to restrain the potential rock thrower, in order to prevent the child from being hurt.
Let us now analyze the reasoning process behind this prediction that the child is likely to get hurt. This inference may be seen to he a direct comequence of another inference; that the rock will shatter the glass pane resulting in an outwardly spreading spray of glass shards that will hit the child. This inference is preceded by yet another inference about the possible trajectory of the rock. The first inference in this chain, namely that the flying rock will hit the glass pane of the window, is derived by the visual system using perceptual and motor operations (in this case scanning, that may involve a mere shift of attention, eye movements, or even turning the head depending on the distances involved, would provide the needed geometric information) in response to the internal goal of predicting the possible trajectory of the rock. The second inference, that the glass will shatter resulting in an outwardly spreading shower of shards, is more interesting. It is clearly not derivable from the environment since it has not happened yet. However, we possess experientially acquired knowledge that glass panes shatter when hit by flying objects. While this "chunk" of knowledge is verbalizable as above, it consists of more than what this verbalization expresses. This is evident from the fact that we are capable of distinguishing situations that "look" alike. For instance, we do not always predict shattering when seeing or thinking about a flying object about to hit a transparent pane. If we also know that the pane is made of non-breakable plastic or that the object is made of soft rubber, we will not predict that the pane will shatter. Note that the relevant knowledge about the material properties of the pane and the' object is conceptual (non-visual) in nature. Thus the knowledge that is brought to hear for making a prediction has a conceptual component. It has a perceptual component as well, which facilitated the visualization of the rock hitting the pane, the pane shattering, and the shards flying outwards in the general direction of the rock's trajectory. This visualization utilizes representations supplied by perception and imaginal operations on them provided by the perceptual architecture. It can he concluded from this visualization that the shards may hit the child. At this point the knowledge that a child hit by flying objects may he hurt kicks in (this knowledge may he purely conceptual, or for very imaginative people, may have a perceptual component that allows them to visualize glass shards penetrating the skin), generating the inference that the particular child currently playing outside the window is likely to he hurt. This of course, is the motivation behind the restraining act.
This scenario brings out some very interesting aspects of commonsense reasoning. One is that quantitative information, such as velocity of the rock on impact, does not seem to have been used by the reasoning process. Therefore this type of reasoning may he classified as qualitative reasoning. The first inference about the rock hitting the window pane was made by scanning the scene along a predicted trajectory. Thus, this reasoning involved perceptual and motor operations applied to the environment (eye movement for scatming) as well as computations on an internal representation of the environment (predicting a trajectory). The second inference about the effects of a collision between the rock and the window pane was done by an internal visualization guided by our experiential knowledge. Thus, this reasoning involved imaginal operations ,applied to an internal representation of the environment. The third inference about the child being hurt was made by applying conceptual knowledge to information derived f~om the visualization.
It is clear that reasoning in this scenario is not merely a process of manipulating sentential or propositional knowledge. Rather, it is a process of go'd-directed inferences made from the enviromnent and its internal representation perceptually as well as inmginally. Generating predictions during such reasoning is mediated by experiential lmowledge that we have about events in the physical world. This is the phenomenon called perceptual reasoning.
We postulate that event predictions during perceptual reasoning are driven by perceptual inference rules that are acquired from the experience of interacting with the physical world. A perceptual rule is a piece of inferential knowledge whose antecedent and consequent have perceptual components. These components additionally are abstract perceptual representations, i.e., they can be matched to a large number of particular situations. Such perceptual rules may often he verbalized, but such verbalizations typically lose some of the information contained in the original perceptual version of the rules. For example, the content of a perceptual rule relevant to the aforementioned glass shattering scenario may he verbalized as "if a flying object hits a glass pane, the pane is likely to shatter," but the corresponding representation has pictorial features that will preserve neighborhood relations which can he used directly during prediction. Such antecedent-consequent perceptual event associations and their generalization into abstract perceptual rules are the result of learning from experience.
The rules need to have conceptual information as well. A rule must have conceptual (non-visual) conditions that allow discrimination among perceptually similar situations, to some of which the rule is applicable while to others it is not. For example, one conceptual condition of the rule on shattering could he that the object he hard and heavy. While perceiving or visualizing a collision between an object and a transparent pane, determining whether the object is indeed hard and heavy requires extraneous (to perception) knowledge. We may know that rocks are generally hard and heavy and that the flying object in the current situation is a rock, and thereby conclude that this conceptual condition is indeed satisfied. Thus, the perceptual and conceptual components together serve to determine the rule's applicability to any particular situation.
The antecedent of a perceptual rule contains abstract specification of a perceptual event that will match with a class of particular perceived or imagined events. For instance, the abstract specification of the collision event in the antecedent of the shattering rule would match with a variety of perceived or imagined collisions between different objects and glass panes of different shapes and orientations. This raises the question of how a perceptual event is specified abstractly. With perceptual representations that are hierarchically structured with levels of increasing detail (such as the objectcentered representations of Mart and Nishihara (1978) ) this is possible since the antecedent specification can he such that it will match the top level(s) of perceptual representations of events belonging to a particular class (e.g., the class collisions between objects and panes). This match need not be affected by details of shapes and orientations of objects and panes involved since these will be represented at lower levels of the representation hierarchy. The consequent of a rule contains a procedural specification of a predicted event, i.e., a specification of how the perceptual architecture should modify the particular representation that matched the rule's antecedent so as to reflect the predicted event's occurrence. This modification of the perceptual representation drives the internal visualization of the predicted event. Thus we are able to visualize the glass pane shatter, for example, immediately following an imagined impact of a rock flying through air.
Perceptual inference rules maybe viewed as stereotypical schemas generated from experience. Their antecedents consi~ of abstract specifications of perceptual events, which can match with a variety of particular perceptual events (actually perceptual representations of events delivered by perception), and conceptual conditions that provide a finer discrimination capability. Their consequents contain plausible predictions. Such rules facilitate not only the making of predictions, but also tbeir visualizations.
How are such rules used7 Particular perceptual events, whether witnessed or imagined, that match the abstract specifications of a rule will trigger the rule. If the corresponding conceptual conditions are also met, the rule will be applied, resulting in the generation of an inference (prediction) as well as the modification of the perceptual representation of the triggering event to reflect the effect of the predicted event. This enables one to visualize the predicted event. All Otis takes place within the perceptual architecture.
This conception of perceptual reasoning is somewhat different from the traditional view of reasoning and deliberation. It was partly motivated by viewing perception and imagery from the artificial intelligence perspective of reasoning. The aim of all this theorizing has been to put forth one explanation of a kind of reasoning that humans engage in routinely and without conscious deliberation. This sort of reasoning has not hitherto received much attention in artilicial intelligence or cognitive psychology.
Discussion
In this paper we characterized representations that underlie visual perception and imagery. Subsequently, a phenomenon that we termed perceptual reasoning was illustrated with an example and explained in terms of perceptual inference rules. For the moment at least, the strength of ideas in this paper lies in the richness of their implications rather than on the extent of their empirical support.
One point of this paper, therefore, is to suggest that it is worth conducting experiments to gather (supporting or opposing) direct evidence. There is some indirect evidence available. Yates and colleagues (Yates et at., 1988) report experimem which showed that individuals solving motion prediction problems, such as predicting the path of a bail released from the end of a rotating sling, subjectively experienced reported solutions as the result of a mental enactment of the problem situation. Furthermore, they suggest that the source of this enactment appeared to be a number of relatively unsystematic, mutually inconsistent, situation-specific prototypes ba.~d on experience, which capture typical aspects of motion. They also cotxsider these prototypes to be consciously accessible conceptual information structures that encompass entire problems. The idea of perceptual inference rules results from applying a similar notion to the realm of perceptual knowledge and inference. In this context, the phenomenon of "perceptual fluency" observed by Jacoby and Dallas (1981) becomes relevant. They found that following a 24-hour delay after subjects studied a word-fist their conscious recognition of these words was at near-chance levels. But the subjects were twice as likely to recognize these words, compared to control words, in a tachistoscopic-recognition paradigm. It is argued that prior exposure leads to "perceptual fluency". On a similar vein, Proflitt aod Keiser (1986) found that subjects were very good at rejecting anomalous motions when shown videotapes of actual and simulated motions. If prior exposure can lead to perceptual fluency in recognition and classilication, is it possible that it can "also lead to perceptual rules for single-step inferences as iu the pane-shattering example?
Let us now consider the implications of this proposal. One implication is that the true nature of representations underlying perception and imagery may he closer to a middle ground between the extreme positions within the propositional and analogic schools of thought. The proposal in this paper explains how reasoning may he situated or grounded in perception. Another implication, therefore, is to suggest that much of commonsense reasoning is tightly coupled with perception and that perceptual representations, not just conceptual knowledge, play a crucial part in the reasoning process. Just as the paradigm of case-based reasoning provided an impetus for the study of memory-based reasoning, our hope is that proposals like this will provide an intpetus for empirical and computational studies of perception-based reasoning. Furthermore, studies of hmnan reasoning ought to pay closer attention to reasoning processes that are closely coupled with perception and perceptual representations. A broader implication is that reasoning may be coupled with perception in modalities other than vision as well. Finally, our stance provides support to a previously expressed view (Lindsay, 1989; Reisherg, 1987) that research on reasoning in artificial intelligence should explore connections to vision and imagery. In fact, our current research is focussed on developing a computational model of perceptual representation and reasoning in the domain of spatially interacting 2-dimensinnal objects depicted in diagrams (Narayanan & Chandrasekarun, 1991) .
